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Chapter 11 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND  
MALAYSIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Cassey Lee 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of the infrastructure sector to the process of economic growth and development has 
long been recognized and understood by scholars and policymakers. Without adequate infrastructure, 
modern commerce characterized by production specialization and exchange across markets would 
grind to a halt. Economic globalization would not take place without the reduction in communication 
and transportation costs brought about by the progress achieved in the development of infrastructure 
within and across countries. Thus, any attempt at understanding Malaysia’s past experiences in 
economic development thus requires an analysis of the role that the infrastructure has played. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of how the infrastructure sector has developed in 
Malaysia and the role it has played in the country’s development. In this chapter, the term 
‘infrastructure’ refers to economic infrastructure, and principally covers transport, energy, information 
and communication technology, drinking water and sanitation. 
 
INVESTMENTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
The Government’s policy on investment in the infrastructure sector during the early years of the 
country’s independence (after 1957) up to the 1970s was mainly focused on ensuring that 
infrastructure capacity was adequate to meet rising demand from a growing economy. During this 
period, the sector’s share of the development expenditure hovered around 20% (Table 1).   
 
The turning point for infrastructure development began in the mid-1970s with the Third Malaysia Plan 
1976-1980, which saw a significant increase in the sector’s share of total development expenditure 
from 12% to 23% (3MP 1976). What influenced this drastic increase in allocation in development 
expenditure on infrastructure in the mid-1970s? One possible explanation for this change was the 
New Economic Policy (NEP). The NEP was implemented beginning in the early 1970s as a response 
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to the racial riots that occurred in May 1969. The main aim of the policy was the enhancement of 
national unity through a two-pronged approach, namely, poverty eradication and wealth redistribution 
across different ethnic communities.  
 
Table 1.   Public Development Expenditure on Infrastructure, 1965-2010 
(Current Prices, RM Million) 
 
 
Sector 
1MP 
(1966-
70) 
2MP 
(1971-
75) 
3MP
(1976-
80) 
4MP
(1981-
85) 
5MP
(1986-
90) 
6MP
(1991-
95) 
7MP
(1996-
2000) 
8MP 
(2001-
05) 
9MP
(2006-
10) 
Transport 544.9 1234.0 2842.8 12966.0 11216.4 11594.7 20484.2 30936.5 30304.4 
Communications 152.0 174.9 1152.1 5034.0 4304.3 71.0 39.6 NA NA 
Electricity 530.6 122.7 1205.3 4828.7 7013.7 17580.8 26107.2 27960.9 29783.9 
Oil & Gas     2923.1 10814.8 30400.0 48300 43800 
Water Supply 150.8 163.1 377.2 3393.6 2467.0 2671.9 2382.7 3882.9 8203.6 
Rural Water        733.9 1206.5 
Sewerage     9.6 8.6 69.1 393.9 57.2 124.8 665.3 1347.9 3132.8 
Total 
Development 
Expenditure on 
Infrastructure 
1387.9 1703.3 5646.5 26616.2 27981.7 42858.0 80079.0 113162.1 116431.2 
Total 
Development 
Expenditure  
6887 14046 24243 62743 35300 54705 99037 170000 200000 
Infrastructure’s 
% Share of 
Development 
Expenditure 
20.2 12.1 23.3 42.4 79.3 78.3 80.9 66.6 58.2 
 
Notes:   MP: Malaysia Plan. 9MP figures refer to allocation and not actual expenditure 
              Prior to 8MP, expenditure figures on rural water supply included under water supply 
  NA:  Not available. 
 
Source: Malaysian Five Year Plans, various years. 
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Under the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, the role of infrastructure (especially the transport sector) 
in realizing the goals of the NEP were defined in terms of the dispersion of economic activities to less 
developed areas (2MP 1971). Thus, aside from new land development, significant increases in 
allocation were observed for the transport sector especially for road development. This trend 
continued under the Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980 (3MP 1976).   
An even larger increase in allocation was made to the infrastructure sector in the Fourth Malaysia 
Plan 1981-1985 (4MP 1981).  Means has argued that the Hussein Onn administration (1976-81) had 
greater resources than the Abdul Razak administration (1970-76) due to the growth of the country’s 
petroleum industry (Means 1991). The Fourth Malaysia Plan would have been formulated under the 
Hussein Onn administration but implemented under the Mahathir administration (1981-2003) during a 
time when even more resources were available. This is borne out by statistics on the sources of 
federal government revenues from 1970 to 1985 (Table 2). During this period, the share of petroleum-
related revenues increased from zero in 1970 to about 25% in 1985. Petroleum-related revenues 
accounted for 40% of the increase in revenues raised between 1970 and 1985.  
 
Table 2.   Sources of Federal Government Revenues, 1970-90 
(RM Million) 
 
Type of Tax 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Direct Taxes 701 2021 5664 9777 10394 22699 29156 
Individuals 168 438 2521 3824 2667 6203 7015 
Companies 489 1166 983 1855 4124 11706 13905 
Petroleum 0 322 1736 3348 2884 2185 6010 
Petroleum Royalties 0 78 345 566 2927 3810 6384 
Others 44 17 79 184 719 2605 2140 
Indirect Taxes 1299 2555 7131 8887 10814 18971 18017 
Export Duties Petroleum 0 0 677 1547 1910 751 999 
Others 1299 2555 6454 7340 8904 18220 17018 
Non Tax Revenue 400 541 1131 2805 6506       8469 14097 
Total 2400 5117 13926 21469 27714 50139 61270
Petroleum-Related Revenues 0 400 2758 5461 7721 6746 13393 
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% Share of Petroleum-Related 
Revenues 0.0 7.8 19.8 25.4 27.9 13.5 21.9 
Source: Five Year plans, various issues. 
In 1985, the Malaysian economy went into a recession when its GDP contracted by 1.1%. This was 
followed by a slow recovery in 1986 when the economy grew by only 1.2%. Even though the period of 
economic slowdown was a relatively short one (as the economy grew at a rate of more than 5%), total 
development expenditure declined to only RM36 billion during the Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-1990 
(5MP 1986). Despite the decline in total development expenditure, infrastructure sector’s share 
increased from 42% in the 4MP to 79% in the 5MP. This was primarily due to the heavy investments 
undertaken in the transport (e.g. North-South Expressway and new Klang Valley expressway) and 
energy sectors (Paka and Kapar power stations) as well as reductions in expenditures on 
administration and security.  
The economic slowdown in the mid-1980s had another, perhaps more significant, impact on the 
infrastructure albeit of a structural manner. Faced with twin deficits (in merchandise and services) and 
mounting external debt during this time, the Malaysian Government responded by accelerating its 
privatization programme. The objectives of the programme included reduction in the administrative 
and financial burden of the Government, improvement in service delivery and increase the 
participation of the bumiputera community in mainstream economic activities. For the infrastructure 
sector, this meant greater private sector participation. This aspect has been critically analyzed by 
various authors (see Jomo 1995; Tan 2008; Naidu & Lee 1997; and the chapter in this volume by 
Jomo & Tan). 
Prior to the late-1980s, most of the investments in infrastructure were primarily undertaken by the 
public sector. Malaysia embarked on an ambitious privatization program in the infrastructure around 
1992/93 during the Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991-1995 (6MP 1991). The programme was extensively 
carried out in various infrastructure subsectors such as electricity, telecommunications, water, 
expressways, ports and airports (see Table 3 for a few of the key privatization exercises). Data on 
investments involving private sector participation in the infrastructure sector indicates that these 
investments reached very high levels in the water supply sector in 1993, the energy sector during 
1994-95, the transport sector during 1994-97, and the telecommunications sector during 1995-96 
(Table 4).   
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Table 4A.   Selected Major Privatization Exercise in Infrastructure Sector 
 
Period 
 
Project 
 
Company 
 
Mode 
Value 
(RM 
million) 
1982-85 Penang Bridge Penang Bridge Sdn Bhd BOT, 25-year 
concession 
1,250 
1988-95 North-South Expressway PLUS Expressways 
Berhad 
BOT, 30+20 - year 
concession 
5,950 
1986 Klang Container Terminal Klang Container Terminal 
– owned by PKA (49%) 
and Konnas Terminal 
Klang (51%) 
Lease and Sale  
1990 Telecommunications Telekom Malaysia 
Berhad 
Partial Equity Sale  
1992 Electricity Supply and 
Distribution 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad Partial Equity Sale 29,850 
1993-97 Paka and Pasir Gudang 
Power Plant 
YTL Power Generation 
Sdn. Bhd 
BOO 3,500 
1993-97 Lumut Power Plant Segari Energy Ventures 
Sdn. Bhd. 
BOO 3,500 
1993-95 Kuala Langat Power 
Plant 
Genting Sanyen Sdn 
Bhd. 
BOO 1,000 
1993-95 LRT 1- STAR Taken over by 
Government (SPNB) in 
2002 for RM3.3 billion 
BOT, 30+30-year 
concession 
3,420 
1994-98 LRT 2 – Putra PUTRA-LRT (100% 
owned by Renong Bhd.) 
Taken over by 
Government (SPNB) in 
2002 for RM4.5 billion 
BOT, 30+30-year 
concession 
5,400 
1994 National Sewerage 
System 
Indah Water Konsortium 
Taken over by 
28-year concession  
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Government in 2000 for 
RM1.625 billion 
1995 Johor Port Johor Port Berhad Equity Sale 1,372 
1997-
2004 
KL Monorail KL Monorail Systems 
Sdn. Bhd. 
Taken over by 
Government (SPNB) in 
2007 for RM4.5 billion 
BOT, 40-year 
concession 
1,180 
Source : Naidu & Lee 1997. Updated by author. 
 
Table 4B.   Investment with Private Sector Participation in Infrastructure Projects, 1990-2007 
(USD Million) 
Year of 
Investment Energy Telecom Transport 
Water & 
Sewerage Total 
Total 
(RM million)
1990 0 870 0 0 870 3,045 
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1992 1,350 0 160 284 1,794 6,279 
1993 1,330 0 814 2,558 4,702 16,457 
1994 3,182 748 2,011 790 6,730 23,555 
1995 1,200 1,012 1,889 10 4,111 14,389 
1996 0 1,033 3,158 0 4,191 14,669 
1997 215 673 2,182 0 3,070 10,745 
1998 0 175 592 0 766 2,681 
1999 195 296 314 0 805 2,818 
2000 0 276 1,278 3,965 5,519 19,317 
2001 1,765 419 684 0 2,868 10,038 
2002 12 477 0 16 506 1,771 
2003 2,050 436 1,570 0 4,056 14,196 
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2004 1,210 1,188 342 2,521 5,261 18,414 
2005 1,600 479 587 0 2,666 9,331 
2006 203 496 531 0 1,230 4,305 
2007 0 634 423 0 1,057 3,700 
Total 14,313 9,211 16,536 10,144 50,204 175,714 
Note:  Exchange rate used: USD1 = RM3.5. 
Source: http://ppi.worldbank.org/index.aspx 
 
 
The total investments with private sector participation during the 1990-2007 period is estimated to be 
around RM175 billion. Today, after more than two decades since the privatization programme began, 
not all of the privatization exercises have been successful. A number of privatized entities were re-
nationalized due to financial difficulties. These include the urban transportation system in Kuala 
Lumpur and national sewerage system (see Jomo & Tan’s chapter). 
EXPANSION OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
The state of the infrastructure sector in Malaysia was generally considered to be adequate around the 
time of the country’s independence in 1957. This was the view of the World Bank mission that visited 
Malaysia in 1954. This assessment was made with reference to meeting the demand for infrastructure 
from the modern sector that was primarily concentrated along the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia.  
As such, infrastructure development was very uneven across different states and between rural and 
urban areas at this point of time. This was to change with the implementation of the New Economic 
Policy (NEP) which began with the Second Malaysia Plan. For the infrastructure sector, the 
implementation of NEP meant that more resources were allocated to the infrastructure sector with the 
aim of improving access to water and electricity in the rural areas.   
In terms of the overall state of infrastructure, the significant increase in development allocations 
during the Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985 (4MP 1981) resulted in rapid expansion in a number of 
infrastructure facilities (Table 5). During this period, the road network expanded by 49%, ports’ 
handling capacity by 122%, electricity generation capacity by 76%, and water supply production 
capacity by 58%. This trend of rapid growth in infrastructure capacity continued to take place in 
subsequent years. Today, the rural population in most of the states in Malaysia (with the exception of 
perhaps Sabah and Sarawak) have relatively good access to water and electricity (Table 5). For other 
sectors such as telecommunications, technological change in the form of the introduction of mobile 
telephony has help increased access to telecommunication services in both urban and rural areas. 
Today, the mobile telephony penetration rate exceeds that of fixed line telephony. The main challenge 
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that remains for the infrastructure sector today is not one of capacity adequacy but the efficiency and 
quality of service delivery. This is affected, to some extent, by the regulatory framework in place in the 
sector. 
Table 5.   State of Infrastructure Development, 1965-2005 
Roads 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Length of Roads (km) 15356 21995 24037 26219 38973 53984 61380 66390.8 77673.4 
Road Density (length/area)     0.12 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.24 
Road Service Level 
(length/population) 
    2.46 3.02 2.96 2.83 2.97 
Railways          
Length of Tracks (km) 2115   2218 2222 2222 2222   
Ports 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Handling Capacity  
(mil. tons) 
   25.5 56.6 120.5 174.1 324.9 443.3 
Vol. Of Cargo Handled  
(mil tons) 
     103.4 152.3 223.9 369.4 
Containerized Cargo (mil. 
TEUs) 
      2.1 4.9 12.1 
Telecommunications 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
No. fixed line 
subscribers (mil) 
 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.0 1.6 3.3 4.6 4.4 
No. Mobile subscribers 
(‘000) 
     78 700 5000 19500 
Internet Dial-up 
subscribers (mil) 
       1.7 3.7 
Internet Broadband 
Subscribers (mil) 
       0.5 3.7 
Electricity 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Generated capacity 
(MW) 
336 836 1022 2385 4197 5242 10835 14291 19217 
Rural coverage (%)      80 92 93 95 
Water supply 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Production capacity (mld) 591 1118 1672 2642 4162 6103 9480 11917 14226 
Non Revenue Water      43 40 40 38 
Urban coverage    89 93 96 96 97 98 
Rural coverage    43 57 67 82 85 92 
Notes km : kilometres  
Mld : million litres per day    
MW : megawatts 
 
 
Regulatory Reforms in Infrastrastructure 
Prior to privatization, infrastructure services were provided by government departments or statutory 
bodies which meant that the infrastructure sector was self-regulated. With privatization, a number of 
sectoral regulatory agencies have been established such as the Malaysian Communications and 
Multimedia Commission (MCMC) in 1988 and Energy Commission (EC) in 2001. These regulatory 
agencies continue to operate under the jurisdiction of ministries where many of the important 
regulatory decisions, particularly those that may impact on public sensitivities such as tariff revisions, 
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require ministerial approval. In many instances, such decisions were also deliberated at the Cabinet 
level.   
 
In sectors where the state government has jurisdiction over natural resources used in the provision of 
infrastructure such as ports and water, a situation of multiple regulatory agencies have emerged. In 
the ports sector, non-privatized ports are regulated by the Ministry of Transport while each privatized 
port is regulated by its own regulatory agency, for example, Bintulu Port is regulated by Bintulu Port 
Authority. There have been discussions to establish a federal agency to regulate all ports including 
privatized ports in Malaysia.  
 
In the water sector, some degree of centralization in regulatory matters has occurred with the 
amendment of the Federal Constitution in 2005 and the passage of both the Water Services Industry 
Act (WSIA) and the National Water Services Commission Act in 2006. With these legislation, issues 
related to water supplies and services are regulated by a federal agency, namely, the National Water 
Services Commission (SPAN, or Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Air Negara), while state governments 
continue to regulate water resources. The changes that these legislations brought have not been 
entirely without controversy – as the ongoing debate on the proposed takeover of the water supply 
and services in Selangor by the state government indicates.  Under WSIA, all water assets are to be 
transferred from state governments to the Pengurusan Aset Air Bhd. (PAAB) by the end of 2009.  
However, disputes emerged in the case of the state of Selangor after the state fell into the hands of 
the opposition coalition (Pakatan Rakyat) following the March 2008 elections.  The then newly formed  
Selangor state government (via its investment arm, Kumpulan Darul Ehsan Bhd.) proposed to 
consolidate the water sector in the state by purchasing the water assets owned by four concession 
holders, namely, Puncak Niaga Sdn. Bhd. (PNSB), Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor (Syabas), Syarikat 
Pengeluar Air Sungai Selangor Sdn. Bhd. (Splash) and Konsortium ABASS Sdn. Bhd. in February 
2009 and June 2009.  Throughout these negotiations, the Federal government has been accused as 
intervening to favour the concessionaires PNSB and Syabas.   
 
In the case of projects privatized via Built-Operate-Transfer (BOT), lease-sale and contract 
management, regulations are imbedded in the contractual agreements in the form of performance 
standards and various other clauses. As the terms and conditions of concession agreements are 
confidential, the exact nature and form of this type of regulation is often not clear. The most important 
of these relate to schedules for tariff increases which has generated significant debates in the media 
for a variety of infrastructure sectors such water supply, electricity supply and expressways. In the 
case of electricity supply and expressways, in particular, the Government has occasionally opted to 
defer tariff increases with the consequence of having to compensate the concessionaires financially 
or renegotiate by extending the concession period. These cases suggest that not only were there 
problems in the privatization process, the regulatory mechanisms in place provided substantial 
discretionary powers to politicians. The two issues are related – a flawed privatization process may 
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require discretionary political powers to correct them. However, not all mistakes can be corrected. In 
the electricity supply sector, for example, the negotiations between TNB and IPPS over the PPAs 
remain controversial even today. For example, in a press interview, the former executive chairman of 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB), Tan Sri Ani Arope, argued that in the power purchase agreement 
(PPA) signed, TNB had to pay a higher price to IPPs (e.g. 15.5 sen per kilowatt to YTL) compared to 
its own generating cost at 8-10 sen per kilowatt (kw). (Ani Arope 2006). This seems to cast doubts on 
the extent of efficiency gains and improvement in consumer welfare achieved in the liberalization of 
the electricity supply sector. No doubt, further reforms are required to finetune the existing regulatory 
framework in the infrastructure. These should include, amongst others, revisiting terms and conditions 
in new concession agreements and the introduction of scheduled tariff revisions. 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE’S CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Infrastructure has, without doubt, played an important role in Malaysia’s economic growth and 
development. The empirical analysis of the impact of infrastructure on economic growth and 
development has been an intensively researched area particularly since the 1980s (see Kessides 
1993 and 2008). Most of the recent literature has focused on uncovering the relationship between 
infrastructure and growth from a macroeconomic perspective using some form of aggregate 
production function. To date, there is no consensus on the impact of infrastructure on economic 
growth in the empirical literature and this partly due to methodological problems (Straub 2008).  In the 
case of Malaysia, most of the discussions on the contribution of infrastructure have mainly taken the 
form of economic history narratives. Both approaches are used to discuss the contributions of 
infrastructure to economic development. 
 
During the pre-independence period, investments in transport infrastructure were mainly undertaken 
in the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia (or Malaya before 1963) to serve the transportation needs of 
tin and rubber industries. This included the construction of railway lines connecting Port Weld to 
Taiping (1885) and Port Swettenham (Port Klang) to Kuala Lumpur (1899) for the purpose of shipping 
tin ore. The development of the rubber industry between the late 19th century and early 1930s was 
clearly made possible with expansion in the railway and road networks (Lim 1967). Thus, an 
extensive road and railway network covering major towns in the East Coast and West Coast of 
Peninsular Malaysia was already in place. The early history of electricity supply is similar to that of 
road and railway – the initial investments in the 1890s and subsequent expansion up to the 1920s 
were undertaken to serve the tin mining industry (Lim 1967). Ironically, mineral resources and rubber 
were also the main reasons for the Japanese occupation of the country from 1941-45 during which 
the infrastructure stock deteriorated significantly. After the Second World War, road transport 
infrastructure expanded more rapidly and became, over time, more important to the economy 
compared to railways. Further upgrading and expansions in Malaysia’s road infrastructure and ports 
(particularly in Peninsular Malaysia) played a crucial part in enabling the subsequently structural 
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changes in the country’s economy in the 1970s and 1980s. All major manufacturing industrial zones 
in the country that emerged during this period such as Bayan Lepas (Penang), Shah Alam (Selangor), 
Senai and Pasir Gudang (Johor) were located in areas with good road access to major ports with 
container facilities (Penang Port, Port Klang and Johor Port) and airports (Cho 1990). Likewise, 
resource-based industries such as wood processing and palm oil benefited from the relatively good 
road networks in Peninsular Malaysia. 
 
Another way to assess the contribution of infrastructure on development is to examine the 
improvements in the quality of life of citizens in the country especially in the rural sector (given that 
much of the initial infrastructure investments were undertaken either in or to connecting urban areas). 
As discussed earlier, overall access figures for water and electricity coverage in rural areas give the 
impression that the rural sector’s infrastructure needs have not been neglected (see Table 5). 
However, water and electricity coverage as well as road transport network in Sabah and Sarawak 
have persistently lagged behind those in Peninsular Malaysia especially in the rural areas (Table 6).   
 
 
Table 6: Water and Electricity Supply Coverage in Malaysia, 2000 & 2005 
 Water Supply Coverage (%) 
 2000 2005 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Malaysia 97.0 85.0 98.0 92.0 
Sabah 89.0 60.0 90.0 61.0 
Sarawak 100.0 92.0 100.0 92.0 
 Electricity Supply Coverage (%) 
  Rural  Rural 
Malaysia  89.5  92.9 
Sabah  67.1  72.8 
Sarawak  66.9  80.8 
 
Source: Ninth Malaysia Plan (9MP2006). 
 
 
In terms of the more quantitative type of evidence on infrastructure and growth in Malaysia, there has 
been no econometric-type analysis that directly links infrastructure to economic growth. This is not 
surprising given data limitations, infrastructure capital stock is both ‘lumpy’, comprises different types 
of assets (e.g. railways, ports, airports) and experience technological change (e.g. fixed line vs. 
cellular/mobile telephony) – all making an econometric analysis of the relationship between 
infrastructure and economic growth difficult.  Furthermore, investments in infrastructure services lead 
to improvements in quality of life which cannot be measured by looking at data on GDP per capita. 
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Indirect empirical evidence on the relationship between infrastructure and growth comes from the 
study that was carried by Tham et al. The authors found a negative relationship between 
transportation cost and export volume for electrical and electronic products (Tham et al. 2008). Given 
that investments in transport infrastructure (e.g. container facilities in Penang Port) are likely to result 
in lower transportation costs and that Malaysia’s economic growth is driven (among other factors) by 
exports of electrical and electronic products (which accounted for around 65% of manufactured 
exports in 2005) – one can deduce that infrastructure investments (at least in the transport sector) 
could have had pro-growth effects in the case of Malaysia. 
 
Another set of important research question relates to the impact of the reforms (e.g. privatization) in 
the infrastructure sectors on economic growth. An econometric analysis would require disentangling 
the effects of investments from changes in ownership (i.e. privatization).  Both effects are often cited 
as gains from privatization – the first by overcoming the Government’s financial constraints, the 
second by bringing about productivity gains. Unfortunately, It is difficult to separate the two effects. 
Most studies would only focus only the second effect, for example, Galal’s study of the privatization of 
the Klang Container Terminal (Galal et al. 1994). Such problems are even more difficult for greenfield 
infrastructure projects such as the 847-km North South Expressway. In this case, in the Seventh 
Malaysia Plan 1996-2000 period, it has been found that the project had reduced travel time by 50% 
and operating cost by 25% (7MP:344-7). Had the project not been privatized, would such gains be 
different? This question can be partially answered in cases where private and public operators 
coexist, for example, in the water sector across different states. In one such study, it was found that 
privatization in the water supply sector per se does not seem to have improved access to treated 
water by (Lee 2009). However, privatization does not also seem to have adversely affected 
affordability in the sector. These ambiguous results are due to the continued presence of the 
Government ( for example, in rural water projects) even after segments of the industry have been 
privatized. 
 
For Malaysia, the difficulty of assessing the impact of infrastructure privatization on growth and 
development is compounded by the official statements on the objectives of and gains from 
privatization. Apart from the above gains (efficiency and overcoming financial constraints), the other 
objectives include the achievement of the NEP objective of wealth redistribution. This, together with 
political economy critique on the process of privatization (for example, rent-seeking behaviour) 
complicates any formal estimation of the impact of privatization on growth and development. Some of 
these issues are discussed in greater depth in a separate chapter (see Jomo & Tan). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Malaysia has made significant investments in its infrastructure sectors. The result has been a fairly 
rapid expansion of infrastructure capital stock for the past fifty years. This has ensured that no major 
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bottlenecks have occurred that would have severely constrained the country’s economic growth. The 
story is not merely of investment and physical expansion of infrastructure but one of structural 
transformation in terms of incentives and ownership. The privatization exercise (coupled with market 
liberalization in some sectors) that began in early 1980s, and which continues until today, even 
though not entirely successful in some sectors, has transformed the infrastructure landscape in the 
country. Some of the problems that have emerged in the sector can be traced back to the privatization 
process and the regulatory reforms that were (and were not) carried out. The experience gained and 
lessons learned from the past in these areas should be used to undertake further reforms in the 
sector.   
 
 
References 
 
 
Ani Arope 2006.   ‘TNB got a raw deal’. Report in The Star, 6 June 2006.  
 
Cho 1990.   The Malaysian Economy: Spatial Perspectives by George Cho. London: Routledge. 
 
Drabble 2000.   An Economic History of Malaya, c.1800-1990 by John Drabble. London: Macmillan. 
 
Fisk & Osman-Rani 1982.   The Political Economy of Malaysia by E.K. Fisk and H. Osman-Rani (eds.). Kuala 
Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 
 
Galal et al. 1994.   Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises: An Empirical Analysis by Ahmed Galal, 
Leroy Jones, Pankaj Tandon and Ingo Vogelsang. New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank. 
 
Jomo 1995.   Privatizing Malaysia: Rents, Rhetoric, Realities by Jomo K. S. (ed.). Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press. 
 
Kessides 1993.   ‘The Contributions of Infrastructure to Economic Development’ by Christine Kessides. World 
Bank Discussion Paper No.213. 
 
Kessides 2008. 
 
       Lee 2009.   ‘Privatization, Water Access and Affordability: Evidence From Malaysian Household Expenditure 
Data’ by Cassey Lee. Mimeograph. 
 
       Lim 1967.   Economic Development of Modern Malaya by Lim Chong Yah. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
              Means 1991. Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation by Gordon P. Means. Singapore: Oxford              
University Press. 
 
              Naidu & Lee 1997.   ‘The transition to privatization: Malaysia’, by G. Naidu, G. and Cassey Lee. In Ashoka Mody 
(ed.), Infrastructure Strategies in East Asia: The Untold Story. Washington DC: World Bank. 
 
              Straub 2008.   ‘Infrastructure and Development: a Critical Appraisal of the Macro Level Literature’ by Stephane 
Straub. World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 4590. 
 
Tan 2008.   Privatizaton in Malaysia by Jeff Tan.  London: Routledge. 
 
Tham et al. 2008.   ‘Infrastructure and trade costs in Malaysia: the importance of FDI and exports’ by Tham Siew-
Yean, Evelyn Devadason and Loke Wai-Heng. In Douglas H. Brooks and David Hummels (eds.), Infrastructure’s 
Role in Lowering Asia’s Trade Costs. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
 
14
 
World Bank 1955.   The Economic Development of Malaya. Richmond: John Hopkins Press for the World Bank. 
 
Malaysian Plans 
 
2MP.   Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1971.   
 
3MP.   Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980. Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1976.   
 
4MP.   Fourth Malaysia Plan 1981-1985. Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1981.   
 
5MP.   Fifth Malaysia Plan 1986-1990. Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department, 1986.   
            
6MP.   Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991-1995. Kuala Lumpur: National Printing Department, 1991. 
 
7MP.   Seventh Malaysia Plan 1996-2000. Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Bhd., 1996. 
 
8MP.   Eighth Malaysia Plan 2001-2005. Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Bhd., 2001. 
 
9MP.   Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010. Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Nasional Malaysia Bhd., 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
